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{Sac. No. 6130. In Bank. Dec. 24. 1953.] 
ROSEMOND M. PHILLIPS, Plaintiff and Appellant. T. 
GEORGE W. PHILLIPS. Defendant and Appelluut. 
[1] Mandamus - Judgment - Oonclusiveness.-W here wife's peti-
tion for writ of mandate to compel clerk of superior court to 
enter memorandum of trial judge iII divorce action as a judg-
nlent was denied by Supreme Court without opinion. such 
decision does not bar consideration of' wife's eontclltions, on 
husband's subsequent appeal from judgment entered about 
three years after memorandum was filed. that only valid 
judgment was that rendered on date memorandum was filed 
and that consequently bushand's notice of appeal was filed 
too late. 
[2] Trial-Findings-Signing and Filing.-When findings of fnct 
are required and have not been filed, judgment is not renderl'd 
until findings have been signed by trial judge and flll'd with 
clerk. 
[8] JUdgments-£ntry.-Once a judgment has been rendel'ed it 
is duty of clerk to enter judgment in judgment book. (Code 
.civ. Proc., § 632.} 
[4] Id.-B.endition.-Memorandum of trial judge meets require-
ments for rendition of a judgment where it is signed by him, 
. filed with clerk, entered in clerk's minutes, contains findings 
of fact and conclusions of law separately stntcd. and complies 
with Code Civ. Proc., § 632. ' 
[2] See Oal.Jur., Trial. ~ 196; Am.Jur., Trinl. § 1136. 
[3] See Cal.Jur .• Judgments, § 34; Am.Jur .. JUdgments, § 71. 
MeK. Dig. References: t1] Mandamus, § IOU' [2] Trial. § 308; 
[3,5,9J Judgments, § 70; [4J JUdgments, § 64; [01 Trinl, § 373; 
{7] Appeal and Error, § 23; (8] Appeal and Enor. § 3S!); [10] 
Appeal and Enor, ~ 261; [11] Jndgml'nts, l\ 79; [121 Appell I nnd 
Error, § 1068; [13] Appeal and Enor, § 254; [14-16] Dh·oJ.'ce, 
§ 60; [17] Divorce, § 195 • 
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[6] Id.-Entry.-Until a judgment is entered, it is not effectual 
for any purpose (Code Civ. Proc., § 664), and at any time 
before it is entered, court may change its conclusions of law 
and enter a judgment different from that first announced. 
[6] Trial-Findings-Amendments.-A judge who has heard the 
evidence may at any time before entry of judgment amend 
or change his findings of fact. 
[7] Appeal-Appellate Jurisdiction.-Want of jurisdiction in re-
viewing court over a premature appeal is absolute, and as 
consent cannot confer jurisdiction, the defect cannot be 
waived. 
[8] Id.-E1iect of Void Appeal.-A premature notice of appeal 
does not stay further proceedings in trial court, since an 
appeal taken before entry of judgment does not confer juris-
diction on appellate court so as to divest trial court of 
authority to take furtber proceedings. 
[9] Judgments-Entry.-Where memorandum of trial judge was 
not entered as a judgment, he had power to substitute new 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and to enter a new 
judgment. 
[10] Appeal-Time to Appeal-Oommencement of Period-Entry 
Nunc Pro Tunc.-Even if a judgment is entered flune pro 
tunc, a party's right to appeal cannot be cut off by antedating 
entry of judgment from which he desires to appeal. 
(11) Judgments-Entry-Nunc Pro Tunc.-Courts have inherent 
power to enter judgments flufle pro tunc so as to relate back 
to time wben they should have been entered, but will do so 
only to avoid injustice 
(12] Appeal-Right to Allege Error-Respondent.-Ordinarily a 
party who has not appealed may not complain of errors. 
[1S] Id.-Time to Appeal-Commencement of Period-Rendition 
or Entry of Judgment.-Where memorandum of trial judge 
complied with Code Civ. Proc., § 632, and constituted a "rendi-
tion" of judgment, a party's notice of appeal, tiled thereafter 
but prior to the entry of judgment, must be deemed to have 
been filed immediately after entry of judgment. (Rules on 
Appeal, role 2(c).) 
[14] Divorce-Causes for Denying-Recrimination.-Doctrlne of 
recrimination may not be mechanically applied by trial judge 
in a divorce case but is an equitable principle to be 'followed 
according to circumstances of each case and with a proper 
respect for paramount interests of community at large. 
[14] Recrimination as an absolute or qualified defense in divorce 
causes, note, 170 A.L.R. 10713. See, also, Cal.Jur., Divorce and 
Separation, § 58; Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation .• § 233. 
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[15] Id.-Causes for Denying-Recrimination.-While trial court 
necessarily has broad discretion in determining issue of re-
crimination in a divorce case, it must give consideration to 
prospects of reconciliation, effect of marital conflict on hus-
band, wife and third parties, and comparative fault of the 
parties. 
[16] Id.-Causes for Denying-Recrimination.-Doctrine of re-
crimination was inapplicable in a divorce case where both 
parties agreed that a reconciliation was impossible; where trial 
judge alluded to the "matrimonial wreck" and evidence sus-
tained findings that husband frequently swore at and cursed 
wife, that he became angry and objected to her course of con-
duct on numerous occasions, that he frequently expressed dis-
satisfaction with and belittled her in presence of guests and 
friends, that after their second marriage following a former 
divorce she made statements to friends that she had agreed to 
reconciliation only because she hoped thereby to get most of his 
money and property, that she took large sums of money from 
his place of business, that she carried on a course of conduct 
designed to irritate him. etc.: where seriousness and fre-
quency of their misconduct and nature of charges made indi-
cate very little possibility of their living together harmo-
niously; and where marital conflict had a serious effect on 
them physically and financially. 
[17] Id. - Temporary Alimony - Appeal. - Whether trial court 
abused its discretion by reducing alimony pendente lite from 
$350 per month during trial to $150 per month on appeal 
will not be determined by Supreme Court where no appeal 
was taken from order fixing amount to be paid pending appeal. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Placer 
County. James Snell. Judge.- Reversed. 
Action for a divorce to which defendant filed a cross-com-
plaint for similar relief. Judgment denying each party a 
divorce reversed. 
Athearn, Chandler, Hoffman & Ange.ll, Reginald G. Hearn 
and Angell. Hearn & Adams for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Chamberlain & Chamberlain, T. L. Chamberlain and F. L. 
Sinclair for Defendant and Appellant. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff Rosemond M. Phillips and de-
fendant George W. Phillips were married in Mexico in 1934. 
On their first wedding anniversary, they had another cere-
• A.ssigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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mony in California to allay any question as to the validity 
of the marriage. In 1945 Rosemond secured an interlocutory 
decree of divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty, and a final 
decree was entered in 1946. A reconciliation followed, and the 
parties were remarried in May of that year. In July, 1948, 
they again separated, and Rosemond brought this action for 
divorce, alleging extreme cruelty. George denied the allega-
tions of cruelty and filed a cross-complaint in which he prayed 
in the alternative for an annulment on the ground of fraud 
or for a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty. Both 
parties alleged that reconciliation was impossible. 
The trial court restrained George from disposing of the 
assets alleged to be community property and ordered him to 
pay stated amounts for Rosemond's costs and attorney fees 
and $300 per month alimony pendente lite. A few days later, 
this order was changed to provide for $350 per month ali-
mony pendente lite and to restrain Rosemond from living in 
the family residence. Subsequently, the alimony was reduced 
to $150 per month. 
Following a trial, the court filed the following memoran-
dum on October 4, 1949: 
"The Court finds from the evidence introduced in this case: 
u 1. That the defendant and cross-complainant has wrong-
fully inflicted upon the plaintiff and cross-defendant grievous 
mental suffering. 
"2. That the plaintiff and cross-defendant has wrongfully 
inflicted upon the defendant and cross-complainant grievous 
mental suffering. 
"It therefore follows that neither party is entitled to a 
divorce from the other. 
"It is ordered that each party to this action be, and that 
they are hereby denied a divorce from the other. . 
"JAMES SNELL" 
The memorandum was entered in the clerk's minutes but 
was not entered in the judgment book. Rosemond moved for 
a new trial and her motion was denied on November 26, 1949. 
On December 22, 1949, she filed a notice of appeal "from that 
certain part of the judgment in said action rendered on the 
4th day of October 1949 whereby the plaintiff is denied a di-
vorce from the defendant." The District Court of Appeal 
affirmed the "judgment" (Phillips v. Phillips, (Cal.App.) 
236 P.2d 816), and this court granted a hearing. It was 
thereafter ascertained that a judgment had never been en-
tered. After communication by the clerk of this court with 
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counsel and the arial court, new findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law were signed by the trial judge and judgment 
was entered on October 14, 1952. The judgment denied each 
party a divorce on the same ground as did the memorandum 
of October 4, 1949. George filed a notice of appeal therefrom 
. on December 12, 1952. Rosemond did not file a second notice 
of appeal. 
Rosemond contends that George's appeal must be dismissed, 
on the grounds that the only valid judgment herein was· the 
one that was rendered on October 4, 1949, and that George's 
notice of appeal, which was not filed untU December 8, 1952, 
was filed too late. 
Rosemond previously sought a writ of mandamus to com-
pel the clerk of the Superior Court of Placer County to enter 
the memorandum of October 4, 1949, as a judgment. [1] The 
petition was denied by this court without opinion. (Phillips 
v. Superior Court, Sac. 6345, December 4, 1952.) That de-
cision does not bar consideration here of Rosemond's conten-
tions. (See Funeral Directors Assn. v. Board of Funeral 
Directors It EmbZamers, 22 Cal.2d 104, 110 [136 P.2d 785].) 
In support of her motion to dismiss the appe&1, Rosemond 
. contends that the written memorandum, signed and filed by 
the trial judge, constituted and was intended by the court 
to be a valid judgment disposing of the case. She states 
that it was the ministerial duty of the clerk to enter the judg-
ment immediately and that the clerk's dereliction cannot im-
pair the finality of the judgment to her prejudice. She also 
argues that the clerk of the trjal court and George have ac-
cepted the memorandum as a judgment and George cannot 
now question it. Finally, she contends that the perfection of 
her appeal stayed all further proceedings in the trial court. 
[2] When, as here, findings of fact are required (LaMa,. 
v. LaMar, 30 Ca1.2d 898, 900 [186 P.2d 678]) and have not 
been waived, judgment is not rendered until the findings have 
been signed by the trial judge and filed with the clerk. (Tru-
bowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co., 30 Ca1.2d 835, 347 [182 
P.2d 182] : Supple v. Luckenbach, 12 Cal.2d 319, 323 [84 P.2d 
52] ; Estate of Dodds, 52 Cal.App.2d 287, 289 [126 P.2d 150] ; 
Easterly v. Cook. 140 Cal.App. 115, 123 [35 P.2d 164] ; see 
29 Cal.L.Rev. 635, 687.) [3] Once the judgment has been 
rendered it is the duty of the clerk to enter the judgment 
in the judgment book. (Code Civ. Proc., § 632: Baker v. 
Brickell, 102 Cal. 620. 623 [36 P. 950]; LaMar v. Superior 
Courf,87 Cal.App.2d 126, 130 (196 P.2d 98] ; Hoover v. LeI-
/ 
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ter, 16 Cal.App. 151, 153 [116 P. 382].) [4) The memo-
randum that was signed by the trial judge, :filed with the 
clerk, and entered in the clerk's minutes, contained findings 
of fact and conclusions of law separately stated and complied 
with section 632 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (See Estate 
of James, 18 Cal.2d 512, 514 [116 P.2d 438] ; Estate of Exter-
stein, 2 Cal.2d 13,15-16 [38 P.2d 151]; Consolidated 1rr. DiBt. 
v. Cranshaw, 130 Cal.App. 455, 462 [20 P.2d 119].) The 
filing of the memorandum, therefore, met the requirements 
for rendition of a judgment. 
[6] It does not follow, however, that the memorandum is 
the judgment. Until a judgment is entered, it is not effectual 
for any purpose (Code Ch,.. Proc., § 664), and at any time 
before it is entered, the court may change its conclusions of 
law and enter a judgment different from that first announced. 
(Brownell v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. 703, 708 [109 P. 91]; 
Crim v. Kessing, 89 Cal. 478, 489 [26 P. 1074, 23 Am.St.Rep. 
491] ; Lind v. Baker, 48 Cal.App.2d 234, 244 [119 P.2d 806]; 
Tilden Lbr. Co. v. Bacon La""d Co., 116 Cal.App. 689. 
694 [3 P.2d 350].) [6] :Moreover, a judge who has heard 
the evidence may at any time before entry of judgment amend 
or change his findings of fact. (Reimer v. Firpo, 94 Cal.App. 
2d 79B. 800-801 [212 P.2d 23]; Magarian v. }foser, 5 Cal. 
App.2d 20B. 210 [42 P.2d 3B5].) 
['1] There is no merit to Rosemond's contention that since 
George. the clerk. and the trial court accepted the memoran-
dum as a judgment. its validity cannot now be questioned. 
As this court stated in Spencer v. Troutt, 133 Cal. 605 [65 
P. 1083], "the want of jurisdiction in this court over a pre-
mature appeal is absolute. and as consent cannot confer juris-
diction. the defect cannot be waived." (133 Cal. at 609; see 
Fong Chuck v. Chin Po Foon, 29 Cal.2d 552, 554 [176 P.2d 
705]: cf. Rules on Appeal, rule 2 (c).) 
[8] The premature notice of appeal did not stay further 
proceedings in the trial court. since an appeal taken before 
entry of judgment does not confer jurisdiction upon the ap-
pellate court so as to divest the trial court of authority to take. 
further proceedings. (Spencer v. Troutt, supra, 133 Cal. 605. 
60B-609: Brady v. Burke, 90 Cal. 1, 5 [27 P. 52].) "Acts of 
the trial court after the premature notice but before entry 
of judgment are valid." (Witkin, New California Rules on 
Appeal, 17 So.Cal.L.Rev. 79, 88.) 
[9] Since the 1949 memorandum was not entered as a 
judgment, the trial judge had the power to substitute new 
/ 
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findings of fact and conclusions of law, and to enter a new 
jUdgment. The only judgment in this case is the judgment 
entered on October 14, 1952, and all issues in this case must 
be resolved on the basis of that judgment. 
Rosemond contends that even if the memorandum is not 
the judgment herein, the judgment entered on October 14, 
1952, should have been entered nunc pro tunc as of October 
4, 1949, and for that reason also George's notice of appeal 
was filed too late. Since George was apparently satisfied with 
the purported judgment of October 4, 1949, and was willing 
to allow severable parts thereof not appealed from by her 
to become final and res judicata, she continues, it would give 
him an unfair advantage to allow him to appeal from the 
judgment subsequently entered. 
The contention is wholly without merit. [10] Even if the 
judgment were entered nunc pro tunc, a party's right to an 
appeal cannot be cut off by antedating the entry of the judg-
ment from which he desires to appeal. (Spencer v. Troutt, 
supra, 133 Cal. 605, 607; Bryant v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 
App.2d 556, 561 [61 P.2d 483]; see 30 Cal.L.Rev. 433. 449.) 
In any event, no reason has been shown why the judgment 
should be entered as of 1949. [11] Courts have inherent 
power to enter judgments nunc pro tunc so as to relate back 
to the time when they should have been entered, but will 
do so only to avoid injustice. (Norton v. Oity of Pomona, 
{) Ca1.2d 54,62 [53 P.2d 952] ; Scoville v. Keglor, 29 Cal.App. 
2d 66, 68 [84 P.2d 212] ; see Mather v. Mather, 22 Ca1.2d 713. 
719 [140 P.2d 808].) In the present case, no "unfair 
\dvantage" will be allowed George if he is permitted to show 
that an adverse jUdgment is e'rroneous; he could change his 
mind and decide to appeal after judgment was entered in 
the case. 
George has made a timely appeal from the judgment 
as a whole and this court has thereby obtained jurisdiction to 
review the entire judgment. [12] It is necessary, however, 
to determine whether Rosemond has also appealed from the 
judgment, since it is the general rule that a party who has 
not appealed may not complain of errors. (Mott v. Horst-
mann, 36 Ca1.2d 388, 393 [224 P.2d 11]; Salter v. Ulrich, 
22 Ca1.2d 263, 268 [138 P.2d 7, 146 A.L.R. 1344].) [13] Rose-
mond filed her notice of appeal on December 22, 1949. The 
judgment was not entered until October 14, 1952, and she did 
not file a second notice of appeal. Rule 2 (c) of the Rules on 
Appeal, as it read before the 1951 amendment thereto, pro-
) 
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vided: "A notice of appeal filed prior to entry of the judg-
ment, but after its rendition, shall be valid and shall be 
deemed to have been filed immediately after entry." As we 
have previously pointed out, the memorandum complied with 
section 632 of the Code of Civil Procedure and constituted 
a "rendition" of judgment. Accordingly, Rosemond'8 notice 
of appeal must be deemed to have been filed immediately after 
entry of judgment. 
The trial court found that each party had a cause of action 
of divorce against the other on the ground of extreme cruelty 
and denied each a divorce on the ground of recrimination. 
(Civ. Code, § 122.) [14] The doctrine of recrimination may 
not be mechanically applied by a trial judge, but it is an 
equitable principle to be followed according to the circum-
stances of each case and with a proper respect for the para-
mount interests of the community at large. (De Burgh v. 
De Burgh, 39 Ca1.2d 858, 870 [250 P.2d 598].) [15] The 
trial court necessarily has a broad discretion. It must, how-
ever, give consideration to the prospects of reconciliation, 
the effect of the marital conflict upon the husband, wife, and 
third parties, and the comparative fault of the parties. (De 
Burgh v. De Burgh, supra, 39 Cal.2d at 873.) 
[16] We have concluded that the doctrine of recrimina-
tion does not apply here. Both parties agreed that a recon-
ciliation was impossible. The trial judge himself alluded to 
the "matrimonial wreck," observed that "I don't think it 
will be pleasant for them both to live in the same house," 
and by court order restrained R{)semond from staying at the 
family residence. . The trial court made detailed findings 
concerning numerous acts of cruelty alleged in the com-
plaint and in the answer and cross-complaint. It found that 
George frequently swore at and cursed Rosemond, that he 
became angry and objected to her course of conduct on 
numerous occasions, that he frequently expressed dissatisfac-
tion with and belittled her in the presence of guests and 
friends, and that when Rosemond insisted that the family car 
have new tires before making a proposed trip to Oakland. 
George became angry and told her, "I hope you break your 
God damn neck." It found that after the second marriage 
Rosemond made statements to friends indicating that she had 
agreed to the reconciliation only because she hoped thereby 
to get most of George's money and property; that Rosemond 
took large sums of money from the place of business George 
operated at Lake Tahoe without his consent; that she earried 
j 
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on a course of conduct designed to irritate and provoke him; 
that she was discourteous and disrespectful to patrons and 
guests at the place of business at Lake Tahoe, causing such 
patrons and guests to state to George that they would take 
their business elsewhere; that she criticized and embarrassed 
George in the presence of friends; and that she told their 
friends on many occasions that he was crazy. The findings 
are supported by substantial evidence. 
This marriage is the second between the parties that has 
failed. The seriousness and frequency of their misconduct 
and the nature of the charges made at the trial, including the 
many unfounded accusations that were made by both parties 
and found to be false by the trial judge, indicate that there 
is little possibility that they will ever be able to overcome 
their differences and live together harmoniously. The marital 
conflict has a serious effect upon the parties. George suffers 
from a heart condition, for which he receives disability com-
pensation, and continued discord may have harmful results. 
Financial considerations may not be entirely ignored, and it 
appears that the conduct of the parties may destroy the 
business of the resort and their livelihood. 
It is clear from the evidence and the findings that 
the legitimate objects of the marriage have been destroyed. 
No public policy would be served by denying a divorce because 
each party was guilty of extreme cruelty toward the other. 
It is a degradation of marriage and a frustration of its pur-
poses to use it as a means of punishing the parties to the 
divorce action. In our opinion. the trial judge should not 
have denied the parties a divorce on the ground that recrim-
ination had been shown. The judgment must therefore be 
reversed. On retrial, the court may determine whether one 
or both parties shall receive the divorce. (De Burgh v. De 
Burgh, supra, 39 Ca1.2d 858, 873.) 
George contends that the trial court should be directed to 
enter judgment that a certain purported' agreement between 
him and Rosemond is void and that there is no community 
property. Rosemond contends that the trial court should be 
directed to enter jUdgment that the agreement is valid and 
that all their property is community. These questions were 
put in issue by the pleadings, but since the trial court denied 
both parties a divorce, it did not resolve them. Since the 
judgment must be reversed, these issues will be decided on the 
retrial of the cause. 
) 
878 PHILLIPS v. PHILLIPS [41 C.2d 
[17] Rosemond contends that the trial court abused its 
discretion by reducing alimony pendente lite from $350 per 
month during the trial to $150 per month on appeal. Since 
no appeal was taken from the order fixing the amount to be 
paid pending appeal, we are without jurisdiction to review 
that order. 
The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. The judgment 
is reversed. 
Gibson, O. J., Oarter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J .-1 would affirm the judgment for the rea-
sons stated by me in De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Oa1.2d 858, 
874 [250 P.2d 598]. 
Spence, J., concurred. 
SHENK, J .-1 dissent. However desirable a change in 
the public policy of this state on the subject of recrimination 
may be thought to be, I feel impelled to adhere to the views 
stated by me in De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Ca1.2d 858, 882 
[250 P.2d 598]. The legislature established the state policy 
in 1872 by the enactment of section 111 of the Civil Code 
where it is provided that: .. Divorce must be denied upon 
showing . . . 4. Recrimination." That policy continued until 
1952 when this court in the De Burgh case ruled otherwise. 
The Legislature has the first right to establish the public policy 
of the state. When it has spoken on a subject so peculiarly 
within its dominion and in no uncertain terms it is incom-
petent for the court to declare otherwise. 
